

Message Text

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SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS, CONVERSATIONS AT SOVIET DINNER PARTY
(SALT TWO-1065)

1. PERSONNEL OF THE U.S. DELEGATION WERE GUESTS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION ON FRIDAY EVENING, JULY 16, AT THE SOVIET COMPOUND. THE FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATIONS DURING THE EVENING.

A. (KLOSSON/SEMENOV, A-1374)

SEMENOV APPROACHED KLOSSON AND SEEMED MORE INTERESTED IN SPEAKING RATHER THAN IN HAVING AN EXCHANGE. SEMENOV MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(1) HE QUESTIONED OUT LOUD WHERE THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE GOING. HE CONSIDERED LITTLE PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE. KLOSSON SUGGESTED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE LIKE A CROSSWORD PUZZLE: ONCE SEVERAL KEY WORDS WERE SOLVED, THE REST WOULD FALL INTO PLACE. SEMENOV DID NOT COMMENT.

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(2) SEMENOV BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF BOMBER VARIANTS. HE

SAID AMBASSADOR JOHNSON REFERS TO THREE KINDS OF VARIANTS: TANKERS, RECONNAISSANCE, AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AIRCRAFT. OTHERS SPEAK ONLY OF TANKERS. KLOSSON SAID WITH REGARD TO TANKERS, THE PROBLEM IS THAT AMERICAN EXPERTS CANNOT TELL THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MYASISHCHEV TANKER AND A MYASISHCHEV BOMBER, SINCE BOTH TYPES APPARENTLY CARRY PROBES. SEMENOV REPLIED THAT THE AMERICAN EXPERTS CAN INDEED TELL THE DIFFERENCE, BUT THEY WANT TO HINDER THE NEGOTIATIONS. KLOSSON SAID THE QUESTION OF THE DIFFERENCE SEEMED TO HIM TO BE A SIMPLE AND PRECISE ONE THAT THE USSR SHOULD BE ABLE TO SEE ITS WAY CLEAR TO ANSWER. SEMENOV ASKED WOULD THE U.S. PROVIDE SPECIFICATIONS ON ITS TANKERS? KLOSSON SAID IF ASKED, OF COURSE.

(3) SEMENOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT UGANDA OR THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC. IT WILL NOT BE DICTATED TO. KLOSSON REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT SEMENOV WAS TALKING ABOUT. THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES DEMONSTRATED THAT THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZED THE USSR AS A GREAT POWER. SEMENOV RETORTED WE WILL NOT BE DICTATED TO.

(4) SEMENOV SAID HE HAD ALREADY BEEN "BURNED" THREE TIMES: ON BACKFIRE, ON II.7 (LIGHT ICBM CEILING), AND ON THE PROPOSED "15 PERCENT" STATEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE THROW-WEIGHT DEFINITION. KLOSSON ASKED WHY SEMENOV CONSIDERED HE HAD BEEN "BURNED" ON THE BACKFIRE ISSUE. SEMENOV REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN GENEVA HAD GIVEN THE U.S. DELEGATION TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON BACKFIRE, BUT THE U.S. PERSISTED IN ITS ORIGINAL POSITION.

(5) SEMENOV ASKED HOW HE WAS TO PREPARE HIS REPORT FOR GROMYKO ON THE NEGOTIATIONS. GROMYKO IS A SERIOUS MAN; WHAT WILL HE THINK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS? KLOSSON ASKED WHETHER SEMENOV DID NOT BELIEVE SOME MOVEMENT COULD BE DETECTED ON THE QUESTION OF MIRV VERIFICATION. IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD SUMMED UP THE QUESTION OF A "BRIDGE" BETWEEN A TEST LAUNCHER AND LAUNCHERS IN THE FIELD WHEN HE HAD DRAWN FOR SEMENOV THE DIAGRAM WITH A SQUARE, A CIRCLE, AND A TRIANGLE. SEMENOV WHISPERED, "SEVENTEEN, EIGHTEEN, AND NINETEEN." KLOSSON SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT SYSTEMS AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD IN MIND, BUT THE DIAGRAM SERVED TO SPELL OUT THE PROBLEM OF FINDING A "BRIDGE". SEMENOV SAID THAT THERE IS ONE -- THE U.S. PROPOSED
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THIRD AGREED STATEMENT REGARDING MIRVS, BUT NOT THE SECOND PART. KLOSSON SAID THAT SINCE THE USSR WAS PROPOSING TO DESIGNATE MIRV MISSILES, WHEREAS THE U.S. PROPOSED TO DESIGNATE LAUNCHERS OF MIRVED MISSILES, HOW COULD THE SOVIET APPROACH PROVIDE A "BRIDGE"? SEMENOV SIMPLY REPLIED THAT IT DID.

(6) IN PASSING SEMENOV SAID HE HAD EXCEEDED HIS INSTRUCTIONS ON MIRVS.

B. (ROWNY/TRUSOV-BELETSKY, A-1372)

(1) GENERAL

BY TURNING IMMEDIATELY TO BUSINESS AND BY THE ABRUPT AND COORDINATED MANNER UNCHARACTERISTIC IN SOCIAL FUNCTIONS, ROWNY RECEIVED THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT TRUSOV AND BELETSKY WERE TRYING TO CONVEY A MESSAGE.

(2) ICBM/MIRVED LAUNCHERS

TRUSOV SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT NO LAUNCHERS OTHER THAN ICBM LAUNCHERS WOULD COUNT UNDER THE 2400 AGGREGATE AND SIMILARLY THAT ONLY MIRVED MISSILE LAUNCHERS WOULD COUNT UNDER THE 1320 AGGREGATE. ROWNY ASKED IF HE WAS NOW PREPARED TO EXPLAIN THE SOVIET FORMULATION "SUCH LAUNCHERS" AND HOW THEY WOULD BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN LAUNCHERS FROM WHICH MISSILE HAD BEEN TESTED AND ALL OTHER "SUCH LAUNCHERS." AVOIDING A DIRECT ANSWER TO ROWNY'S QUESTION, TRUSOV SAID THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD REJECT ALL MOVES ON OUR PART TO ATTEMPT TO GET THEM TO COUNT IN THE AGGREGATES LAUNCHERS WHICH WERE NOT ICBM OR MIRVED MISSILE LAUNCHERS. WHEN ROWNY AGAIN REPEATED HIS SPECIFIC QUESTION TRUSOV ONCE MORE AVOIDED A DIRECT ANSWER AND SAID WE COULD TELL WHAT SHOULD AND SHOULD NOT COUNT IN THE AGGREGATES BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. PRESSING HIM FURTHER ROWNY ASKED IF TRUSOV UNDERSTOOD OUR USE OF THE WORD "TYPE" AND WHETHER ANOTHER WORD COULD BE FOUND TO BRIDGE THE GAP. TRUSOV SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR FORMULATION AND WANTED AGAIN TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT SEARCHING FOR SYNONYMS WOULD BE A WASTE OF TIME. ROWNY REMARKED THAT HE DID NOT FIND SUCH AN APPROACH VERY HELPFUL AND ASKED WHAT, IN TRUSOV'S OPINION, WAS OUR OBJECTIVE IN GENEVA IF WE WERE NOT TO BRING CLARITY TO THE TEXT OF THE JDT. TRUSOV SAID WE WERE TO CLEAR UP AS MANY OF THE REMAINING ISSUES OF THE JDT AS POSSIBLE, AND THAT THEIR SIDE WOULD LISTEN PATIENTLY TO ANYTHING WE HAD TO
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SAY. HOWEVER, HE ADDED, THEIR SIDE WAS IN NO HURRY AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT ACCEPT PROVISIONS WHICH WENT "COUNTER TO THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT VLADIVOSTOK." HE SAID THE U.S. WAS RESISTING AGREEMENT AND HE HAD NO LESS AUTHORITY THAN GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV'S BERLIN SPEECH TO BACK HIM UP.

(3) OBSTACLES TO NEGOTIATIONS

BELETSKY SAID THAT THEIR SIDE HAD BEEN CLEAR FOR OVER A YEAR ON HOW TO DEFINE SYSTEMS AND THAT THE U.S. KEPT INTRODUCING "ONE NEW OBSTACLE AFTER ANOTHER." ROWNY DISAGREED, SAYING THAT WE HAD CLARIFIED MANY POINTS DURING THE DISCUSSIONS AND THAT BOTH SIDES HAD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR AGREEMENTS AND DIFFERENCES. IN RESPONSE TO ROWNY'S REQUEST FOR EXAMPLES OF "OBSTACLES" BELETSKY REPLIED WITH THE MAY 26, 1972 DATE. ROWNY ASKED IF

BELETSKY WAS AWARE OF AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S EXPLANATION AND WHETHER HE AGREED WITH IT. TRUSOV INTERRUPTED TO SAY HE WAS AWARE OF IT AND WOULD LIKE TO CITE ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF OUR "ENDLESS LINE OF COMPLICATIONS," NAMELY, THE THROW-WEIGHT DEFINITION. TRUSOV SAID THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD REPLY IN DUE TIME TO OUR LATEST PROPOSAL ON THE MAY 26, 1972 DATE.

(4) THROW-WEIGHT DEFINITION

TRUSOV SAID OUR ATTEMPTS TO LINK VELOCITY WITH "TOEHR APPROPRIATE DEVICES" WAS UNNECESSARY. HE SAID AN "OTHER APPROPRIATE DEVICE" COULD BE IDENTIFIED BY ITS FUNCTION. HE SAID DETERMINING "OTHER APPROPRIATE DEVICES" BY FUNCTION WAS SUFFICIENT FOR THEIR PURPOSES, BUT THAT IF OUR SIDE WANTED TO CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THE MATTER IN THE DRAFTING GROUP THEY WOULD POLITELY AND PATIENTLY LISTEN.

(5) ROWNY COMMENT

ROWNY'S OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE EVENING'S CONVERSATION WAS THAT TRUSOV AND BELETSKY HAD NOTHING NEW OF SUBSTANCE TO OFFER BUT WANTED TO CONVEY THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS IN NO HURRY. IN OTHER WORDS, ANY AGREEMENT REACHED AT DELEGATION LEVEL BEFORE THE RECESS WOULD HAVE TO BE ON THEIR TERMS. SPECIFICALLY, TRUSOV MADE IT CLEAR THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT A "TYPE ROLE" IN ANY FORM FOR COUNTING ICBM OR MIRV LAUNCHERS. JOHNSON

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